Russia has shifted its main effort from capacity to cash. Ports and vessels have taken 70+ and 62 strikes; exports are down 75% year on year on a near-normal 60 Mt crop, against an 11 Mt storage shortfall and no export income reaching farmers for spring seed. Energy and heating is the next campaign, not this one — it starts in October.
The tactic to plan against is the second wave. On 23 August a drone struck the halted Lozova–Kharkiv train at Lymanivka, killed a passenger, then struck it again with rescuers on scene.
Ukraine is a country you can work in with preparation and cannot work in without it: the air threat is now the routine condition rather than the exception, what decides your week is how long you are driven off task, and the campaign that will decide your quarter has moved off the grid and onto ports, exports and the food chain.
The month. Across the four measured weeks to 27 August, 4,090 projectiles were put into the country — 3,922 drones and at least 168 missiles. Interception held at 81%, and that still left 747 drones arriving: about 27 a day, every day. Civilian casualties were 363 killed and 2,294 injured, a floor rather than a total, and one shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih on 21 August accounted for 16 of the deaths on its own.
What changed. The main effort moved from destroying capacity to destroying income. Ports and vessels have taken 70+ and 62 strikes and exports are down 75% year on year on a near-normal 60 Mt crop, against an 11 Mt storage shortfall. Energy and heating is the next campaign, not this one — it starts in October.
What it means on the ground. Volume at this level is not what stops work; duration is. Five oblasts spent more hours under alert than a statutory working week, and rail ran to a 134-minute median delay when affected. The exposed flank for most organisations is export-dependent logistics and stock, not the grid. And the tactic to plan against is the second wave: on 23 August a drone struck a halted train, then struck it again with rescuers on scene.
What we rate. On the axes that decide whether people can work we rate ballistic threat 6 · Extreme, and alerts, rail and port access 5 · High. Water and public order sit at 3 · Moderate, telecoms at 2 · Low. Occupied territory is not assessed at all.
3,922 drones and 168+ missiles · four weeks, up 24% on the first week · stopped pale, arrived dark
747 still arrived — about 27 a day, every day
363 killed, a floor · four weeks, down 31% on the first week · injured shaded, killed marked
Luhansk is not assessed · Kyiv City counted separately
3 of 7 nights. 7 downed; no rate computable.
No change on the weekExtreme >95% likely5 of 10 downed, but only 3 nights.
Up 1 on the weekModerate 40–50% likely1,242 launched, 79% downed. ~256 arrived.
Up 1 on the weekSubstantial 55–75% likelyDnipropetrovsk 151 of 152 measured hours.
No change on the weekHigh 80–90% likely9 settlements ordered evacuated, 26 Aug.
No change on the weekSubstantial 55–75% likely134 min median delay, 98 services affected.
Up 1 on the weekHigh 80–90% likelyGreater Odesa at 3–4 ships a day.
No change on the weekHigh 80–90% likelyKherson TPP hit 26 Aug. No national rationing.
No change on the weekSubstantial 55–75% likelyAssessed from power dependency.
No change on the weekModerate 40–50% likelyWorst dip −5.3% (Chernihiv) vs own median.
No change on the weekLow 25–35% likelyAgainst Ukraine's pre-invasion mean.
No change on the weekModerate 40–50% likelyEleven axes · 31 Jul – 27 Aug
Our operational risk instrument. Eleven fixed axes, each scored 1–6 on one scale. The axes never change, so a leg that moves is the environment moving, not us changing the question.
4.00 mean of 11 · 31 Jul – 27 Aug, 28 days over 4 measured weeks
Why it is not scored. Every band on this page is built from measures that exist only where Ukrainian administration reaches: alert hours published by oblast, rail performance, casualty aggregates, utility notices. None of that is produced for occupied ground. Scoring it anyway would mean scoring our own ignorance and presenting it as an assessment.
What the designation means for you. Treat it as no lawful access rather than as high risk: there is no insurance, no consular route, no lawful basis for a commercial presence and no medical chain we can plan against. The practical question is not how dangerous it is but how close your people, routes and suppliers come to the line.
Partly occupied oblasts. Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Sumy are scored for the government-controlled part only, and the map hatches the rest. A score of 5 in Kherson is a statement about the west bank, not about the oblast on a pre-2022 map.
Every axis on this page is somebody’s decision — whether the office opens, whether the convoy runs, when work stops and who answers at three in the morning — and that is the work: we turn this month’s operational risk into the thresholds, plans and cover your people rely on, and we stay on the line when they need them.
