




UKRAINE

SECURITY UPDATE

BOTTOM LINE

- ♦ Ballistic missile defence has effectively ceased to function. No interception was reported and the figure is no longer published.
- ♦ Air defence has diverged by class: 82% of drones and 89% of cruise missiles neutralised. Risk concentrates where warning is 3–8 minutes.
- ♦ Treat Greater Odesa as closed for planning. Exports at 31% of capacity, and disruption has spread from grain into metals.



STRIKE INTENSITY  low to high · occupied territory excluded

949

PROJECTILES USED

drones and missiles, seven nights

780

NEUTRALISED

82% of those used



DRONES

One-way attack drones and loitering munitions.

903


USED

741

NEUTRALISED

82%

SUCCESS RATE



used neutralised

VOLUME

▲ 13%

SUCCESS RATE

▲ 3%

REACHED TARGET

▲ 1%

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ◆ 162 drones reached their target across seven nights. That is the routine risk, and it does not depend on a bad night.
- ◆ The success rate has held between 80% and 83% for four consecutive periods. Volume is what moves, not the defence.
- ◆ Warning is usually sufficient to reach shelter. Plan for disruption and debris rather than for interception failure.



MISSILES

Ballistic and cruise are reported separately. They behave differently.

46

USED


39

NEUTRALISED

89%

CRUISE ONLY

ballistic not reported



BALLISTIC INTERCEPTION IS NO LONGER PUBLISHED

Ukraine stopped publishing ballistic interception figures in early August, after interceptor stocks ran down. Ballistic missiles were used on 3 of the 7 nights in this period and no interception was reported for any of them.

The neutralised figure above therefore covers cruise missiles only. The last published ballistic rate was 15% in July, then 1 of 27 on 1 August.

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ♦ Ballistic gives 3 to 8 minutes of warning and is currently unopposed. Cruise gives around 30 minutes and is stopped nine times in ten.
- ♦ Assume shelter-in-place, not relocation, for staff in cities behind the line. There is no useful margin to move people in.



CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

All reporting oblasts. Civilians only. A floor, not a ceiling.

70


KILLED

388

INJURED

458

TOTAL CASUALTIES



injured killed

KILLED

▼ 30%

INJURED

▼ 32%

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ◆ Casualties fell against the previous period, but the fall tracks strike volume rather than any improvement in protection.
- ◆ The overnight attack of 20 August killed 15 in Kyiv; 17 died in the city across that day. Weekly totals turn on single mass-casualty nights, so a quieter week is not a safer one.
- ◆ Our count is current to the day. UN verified figures publish monthly and land several weeks later.



OPERATIONAL RISK

Our assessment, on our six-level scale.

Ballistic missile threat Used 3 of 7 nights. None reported downed.		EXTREME
Air-raid alert disruption 5 oblasts above 118 of 144 hours.		HIGH
Maritime and port access Exports at 31% of capacity.		HIGH
Power supply 13 strikes on gas plant. One TPP offline.		SUBSTANTIAL
Railway 73 min median delay when affected.		SUBSTANTIAL
Access restrictions 16 settlements ordered evacuated, 18 Aug.		SUBSTANTIAL
Drone threat 82% neutralised. 162 reached target.		MODERATE
Water supply Assessed from power dependency.		MODERATE
Public order and crime Against Ukraine's pre-invasion mean.		MODERATE
Telecoms Kherson –6.2%, Donetsk –5.8% vs own median.		LOW
Cruise missile threat 89% neutralised. ~30 min warning.		LOW



UTILITIES & LOGISTICS

What is actually degraded, and by how much.


POWER 13 strikes on Naftogaz facilities in the week to 17 August, 293 this year. One DTEK thermal plant forced offline. 90,000 Kyiv households cut overnight on 20 August, restored same day. No nationwide rationing scheduled.

WATER No national series exists. We assess water risk from power dependency: pumping and treatment fail with the grid. Treat interruption as co-located with power loss.

RAIL 73 minute median delay, 38 services affected. This is severity for services already disrupted, not your odds of disruption.

MARITIME Exports at 31% of capacity, grain at 20%. Alternative routing costs a minimum \$50 per tonne. Ukraine referred 52 vessel attacks to the IMO on 21 August.

HOURS UNDER AIR-RAID ALERT



Measured to the start of the final day: 144 hours of the period's 168.

Dnipropetrovsk spent 143 of those 168 hours under alert, 85% of the period, and 143 of the 144 measured.

Plan on the alert being the default state.

ASSESSMENT

Military and geopolitical.

MILITARY

- ◆ No settlement changed hands. Russian claims to Andriivka, Mykolaipillia and Novosoloshyne were contradicted by Russian sources; some supporting footage is assessed as synthetic.
- ◆ Movement was tactical both ways. Russian forces advanced at Kupyansk and in eastern Kostiantynivka; Ukrainian forces advanced east of Sloviansk and cleared Lyman.
- ◆ Ukrainian deep strikes reached 1,488 km, hitting refineries in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Perm. We assess this capability as sustained, not episodic.

GEOPOLITICAL

- ◆ No negotiations. Russia restated its terms on 21 August, conditional on its own objectives and conditions on the ground.
- ◆ France, Germany and the UK began building a joint negotiating format. We assess this as positioning against exclusion from a US-led process, not an active track.
- ◆ Three incidents touched NATO territory in five days — Romania, the Neptun Deep platform, Finland. We assess Black Sea spillover risk as rising.



ASSESSMENT

Economic and political.

ECONOMIC

- ◆ Sea access, not power, was the binding constraint. Exports ran at 31% of capacity, grain at 20%, with a \$50 per tonne routing premium.
- ◆ Metinvest guided to a 30% cut in August output. We assess the export constraint as having moved from agriculture into metals.
- ◆ The hryvnia held at 44.70 on \$2.11bn of central bank intervention in two weeks. Direct war damage stands above \$197.5bn.

INTERNAL POLITICAL

- ◆ Parliament filled the Defence Ministry on 19 August after a five-week vacancy.
- ◆ Anti-corruption authorities served notices in a corporate raiding case reaching the Presidential Office; a deputy head was dismissed and detained. The alleged method — compromised state registries and forged court rulings — is a direct asset security concern.
- ◆ Protests over the dismissal continued in central Kyiv: announced in advance, peaceful, diminishing.

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

- ◆ Assume shelter-in-place rather than interception for staff in cities behind the line. Ballistic warning time does not permit relocation.
- ◆ Drone leakage is the routine risk, not the exceptional one: 82% interception still placed approximately 162 weapons on target across seven nights.
- ◆ Stress-test any Black Sea delivery leg against a multi-month rail or Danube fallback, and price the \$50 per tonne premium into contracts now.
- ◆ Verify Ukrainian corporate and property registry entries independently. The raiding methodology under investigation targets exactly those records.



METHODOLOGY

How every figure here is produced.

AIR THREAT

We read every nightly Air Force bulletin in the original and extract launches and interceptions by weapon class. Each bulletin carries its own headline total, which we use as a checksum — this period our figures reconciled on 7 of 7 nights.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

We compile civilian killed and injured from the daily reporting of every oblast administration that publishes it — nine this period, covering every oblast where casualties were recorded — the same way each week. Successive updates to one incident are read as revisions, not additions. This is current to the day; UN verified counts publish monthly and lag by weeks.

OPERATIONAL RISK

Eleven axes, six levels, our scale and our assessment. The thresholds behind them are externally published standards — the statutory 40-hour week for alert disruption, EU rail compensation rules, Ukraine's own pre-invasion crime mean. Connectivity is measured by IODA active probing (Georgia Tech).

COVERAGE

Air activity: 7 of 7 nights, reconciled. Civilian casualties: 6 complete days across 9 oblasts. Oblast administrations report the previous day, so each period's final day carries into the next edition.

TALK TO US

We produce this every week. For clients we build it around your own footprint — your sites, your routes, your people — at a level of detail this public edition cannot carry.

- ◆ Security risk management
- ◆ Travel security
- ◆ Intelligence support
- ◆ Crisis planning
- ◆ Training

Tell us where you operate and we will show you what this looks like for you.



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