




UKRAINE

SECURITY UPDATE

BOTTOM LINE

- ◆ A two-wave strike on a Kryvyi Rih shopping centre on 21 August killed 16 and injured 130 — 25% of the period's national deaths in one incident. The second wave struck the emergency response.
- ◆ Drone volume rose 41% to 1,242, the highest of the 4 periods. Interception held at 79%, so roughly 256 weapons still arrived.
- ◆ Ballistic interceptions were reported again for the first time since early August — 7 on 27 August. The launch count was withheld, so no interception rate is computable and we state none.



STRIKE INTENSITY



low to high · occupied territory excluded

1,264

PROJECTILES USED, AT LEAST

drones and missiles, 7 nights

1,000

NEUTRALISED

79% of a floor, at most



DRONES

One-way attack drones and loitering munitions.

1,242


USED

986

NEUTRALISED

79%

SUCCESS RATE



used neutralised

VOLUME

▲ 41%

SUCCESS RATE

▼ 4%

REACHED TARGET

▲ 64%

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ◆ 256 drones reached their target across 7 nights. That is the routine risk, and it does not depend on a bad night.
- ◆ The success rate has stayed between 79% and 82% across the 4 periods. Volume is what moves, not the defence.
- ◆ Warning is usually sufficient to reach shelter. Plan for disruption and debris rather than for interception failure.



MISSILES

Ballistic and cruise are reported separately. They behave differently.

22

FIRED, AT LEAST

one salvo count withheld

14


NEUTRALISED

across all 4 classes

64%

DOWNED, AT MOST

22 is a floor, so read it down



WHY 64% IS A CEILING, NOT A MEASUREMENT

The 22 fired: 10 cruise, at least 7 ballistic, 4 anti-ship, 1 anti-radar. The 14 downed: 7 ballistic, 5 cruise, 2 anti-ship.

The ballistic 7 is an interception count with no launch count beside it: on 2 of 3 nights the Air Force said what it stopped, not what was fired. So more than 22 were fired and the rate reads high. Cruise, 5 of 10, is the only class counted both ways.

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ♦ Ballistic gives 3-8 minutes of warning. Interceptions were reported this period but the launch count was not, so the defence cannot be rated. Cruise gives around 30 minutes; 5 of 10 were stopped over 3 nights, too few to read as a trend.
- ♦ Assume shelter-in-place, not relocation, for staff in cities behind the line. There is no useful margin to move people in.



CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

All reporting oblasts. Civilians only. A floor, not a ceiling.

65


KILLED

538

INJURED

603

TOTAL CASUALTIES



No week-on-week change shown: this period was measured over 11 reporting oblasts against 9 last period, so a percentage would report our own coverage rather than the war.

WHAT THIS MEANS

- ◆ This period was measured over 11 reporting oblasts against 9 last period, so the totals are not comparable period-on-period yet. We do not read the movement as a change in protection; it turns on how many mass-casualty incidents landed in the 7 days.
- ◆ One incident dominated: the two-wave strike on a Kryvyi Rih shopping centre on 21 August, 16 killed and 130 injured — about 25% of both totals. Weekly figures turn on single events, so a lower total is not a safer period.
- ◆ Our count is current to the day. UN verified figures publish monthly and land several weeks later.



OPERATIONAL RISK

Our assessment, on our 6-level scale.

Ballistic missile threat 3 of 7 nights. 7 downed; no rate computable.		EXTREME
Air-raid alert disruption Dnipropetrovsk 151 of 152 measured hours.		HIGH
Maritime and port access Greater Odesa at 3–4 ships a day.		HIGH
Railway 134 min median delay, 98 services affected.		HIGH
Drone threat 1,242 launched, 79% downed. ~256 arrived.		SUBSTANTIAL
Power supply Kherson TPP hit 26 Aug. No national rationing.		SUBSTANTIAL
Access restrictions 9 settlements ordered evacuated, 26 Aug.		SUBSTANTIAL
Cruise missile threat 5 of 10 downed, but only 3 nights.		MODERATE
Water supply Assessed from power dependency.		MODERATE
Public order and crime Against Ukraine's pre-invasion mean.		MODERATE
Telecoms Worst dip –5.3% (Chernihiv) vs own median.		LOW



UTILITIES & LOGISTICS

What is actually degraded, and by how much.

- POWER**


Ukrenergo announced no nationwide restrictions on every day it published a schedule. Damage was local: a guided aerial bomb severely damaged Kherson's thermal plant on 26 August, Kyiv lost supply after the 26 August barrage, 7 settlements in Myrhorod district were cut on 27 August. Over 70% of residential buildings are reported ready for the heating season.
- WATER**

No national series exists. We assess water risk from power dependency: pumping and treatment fail with the grid. Odesa settlements lost water with power on 22 August. Treat interruption as co-located with power loss.
- RAIL**

Our reading of live delay data: 134 minute median delay across 98 affected services, both worse than last period. This is severity for services already disrupted, not your odds of disruption. A drone struck the halted Lozova-Kharkiv train at Lymanivka on 23 August, killing a passenger, then struck it again with rescuers on scene.
- MARITIME**

Zelensky said on 24 August that 3 to 4 ships a day still enter and leave Greater Odesa. Ukraine's agriculture ministry puts August grain exports at about 20% of potential. Russia reaffirmed its refusal of a mutual truce on strikes against civilian shipping.

HOURS UNDER AIR-RAID ALERT



Measured to the dataset's last observation: 152 hours of the period's 168.

Dnipropetrovsk spent 151 of those 152 measured hours under alert — 99% of what was measured, and 90% of the full period.

Plan on the alert being the default state.

ASSESSMENT

What changed this period, and what it means.

MILITARY

- ◆ Russian forces reportedly seized Illinivka, south-west of Kostiantynivka, on 26 August and pushed Ukrainian units back across the Kryvyi Torets in the city's south-east. These gains likely support an envelopment of Kostiantynivka.
- ◆ Mapping showed Rodynske, near Pokrovsk, as fully occupied on 22 August, while Ukraine's Kursk Grouping refuted a Russian flag-raising claim at Pysarivka. Russian territorial claims are likely outpacing verifiable control.
- ◆ Ukrainian forces struck the Kstovo refinery on 26 August and Afipsky on 25 August. Ukraine assessed Kstovo at up to 11 percent of Russian petrol output, and the tempo suggests a sustained campaign against refining capacity.

GEOPOLITICAL

- ◆ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov signalled openness to new ideas on 21 August while restating Moscow's existing conditions, and the United States declined on 24 August to join a call by more than 50 states for an unconditional ceasefire.
- ◆ The Coalition of the Willing met in Kyiv on 24 August, designating air defence an urgent priority and committing to tighter sanctions, with no senior US official present. European states are likely deepening commitments as US engagement narrows.
- ◆ CIA Director Ratcliffe travelled to Moscow on 25 August in the first known visit by a US intelligence chief since November 2021 and met Russian intelligence officials. The channel is likely reopened, though its substance remains unclear.

ECONOMIC

- ◆ Three to four vessels a day are entering and leaving Greater Odesa while August grain exports run at roughly 20 percent of potential, indicating that Russian pressure on shipping is achieving its effect without a formal blockade.
- ◆ Ukrenergopro announced no nationwide restrictions on any day for which it published a schedule and reported over 70 percent of homes ready for winter, though a guided bomb severely damaged Kherson's thermal plant on 26 August. Single-plant losses are likely the greater risk.
- ◆ Ukraine put its 2026 defence shortfall at approximately \$27 billion on 24 August, and the European Commission approved a further €6.1 billion of procurement the same day, payable only against signed contracts. Disbursement speed will likely determine the effect.



ASSESSMENT

What changed this period, and what it means.

INTERNAL POLITICAL

- ◆ From 25 August the Diia portal displays the expiry of a company's reservation entitlement, and firms confirmed critical before 2 June 2026 may reserve staff only until 1 September, when a higher salary threshold takes effect. This is likely the period's most immediate staffing constraint.
- ◆ A Rada committee secretary said on 24 August that the General Staff is considering reducing the mobilisation ceiling from 60 to between 50 and 55. No decision has been taken and no legislation is required, so a change may arrive with little notice.
- ◆ The Higher Anti-Corruption Court remanded a former deputy head of the Presidential Office on 25 August, and a crowd in Ternopil attacked a conscription office vehicle and its personnel the same day. Enforcement is likely intensifying as public tolerance for it declines.

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

- ◆ Russian forces will likely continue to strike civilian sites in two waves, with the second arriving 30 to 40 minutes after the first and falling on the emergency response. Personnel should remain clear of an impact site through the first hour, including staff trained to assist.
- ◆ Interception held at 79 percent and still placed approximately 256 weapons on target across seven nights, with launch volume rising. Planning should assume regular leakage at these volumes.
- ◆ The Air Force has published no launch count alongside its ballistic interception figures since 8 August, so air defence performance can no longer be measured. Assumptions carried over from July should be treated as unevidenced rather than current.



METHODOLOGY

How every figure here is produced.

AIR THREAT

We read every nightly Air Force bulletin in the original and extract launches and interceptions by weapon class. Each bulletin carries its own headline total, which we use as a checksum — this period our figures reconciled on 7 of 7 nights.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

We compile civilian killed and injured from the daily reporting of every oblast administration that publishes it — 24 this period, with casualties recorded in 11 of them — the same way each week. Successive updates to one incident are read as revisions, not additions. This is current to the day; UN verified counts publish monthly and lag by weeks.

OPERATIONAL RISK

11 axes, 6 levels, our scale and our assessment. The thresholds behind them are externally published standards — the statutory 40-hour week for alert disruption, EU rail compensation rules, Ukraine's own pre-invasion crime mean. Connectivity is measured by IODA active probing (Georgia Tech).

TALK TO US

We produce this every week. For clients we build it around your own footprint — your sites, your routes, your people — at a level of detail this public edition cannot carry.

- ◆ Security risk management
- ◆ Travel security
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